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Abstract
We present a model of contracting between a purchaser of health services and a
provider (a hospital). We assume that hospitals provide two alternative treatments for
a given diagnosis: a less intensive one (for example a medical treatment) and a more
intensive one (surgical treatment). We assume that prices are set equal to the average
cost reported by the providers, as observed in many OECD countries (yardstick com-
petition). The purchaser has two options: 1) to set one tari⁄ based on the diagnosis
only; 2) to di⁄erentiate the tari⁄ between the surgical and the medical treatment (i.e.
to re￿ne the tari⁄). We show that when tari⁄s are re￿ned, the provider has always an
incentive to overprovide the surgical treatment. If the tari⁄is not re￿ned, the hospital
underprovides the surgical treatment (and overprovides the medical treatment) if the
degree of altruism is su¢ ciently low compared the opportunity cost of public funds.
Our main result is that price re￿nement might not be optimal.
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11 Introduction
In the last twenty ￿ve years many OECD countries have adopted some form of DRG (Di-
agnosis Related Group) prospective payment system to reimburse hospitals. The payment
system was ￿rst introduced in 1983 by the US Medicare Programme to remunerate hospi-
tals for treating the elderly. The DRG system is believed to be a powerful tool to induce
hospitals to reduce costs, and under certain conditions to encourage increase in activity
and quality. Hospitals are paid a ￿xed price for each patient treated. At admission every
patient is assigned to one of about 500 DRG based on their registered primary diagnosis.
Each DRG bears a weight re￿ ecting the average cost of patients in the given DRG rela-
tive to that of the average patient reimbursed by the system (MedPAC, 2007). The price
for each patient treated is obtained by multiplying the relevant DRG weight by a ￿xed
monetary value.
Since Medicare adopted the DRG payment system several re￿nements have been in-
troduced. Re￿nements involve splitting a single DRG category into two or more DRG
categories relating to the same primary diagnosis. The split has mainly been based on the
type of treatment the patient receives. Patients diagnosed with the same primary diagno-
sis are grouped into di⁄erent DRG categories. For example, patients receiving treatment
involving a surgical procedure are grouped into a di⁄erent category than patients receiving
a medical treatment for the same disease (McClellan, 1997; Gilman, 1999; 2000).
This study investigates the conditions under which re￿nement of DRG weights and
therefore prices is optimal. If prices could be set by the purchaser of health services
at any arbitrary level, then it would seem intuitive that re￿nement is always welfare
enhancing. By splitting one DRG into two DRGs (i.e. moving from one price to two
prices) the purchaser e⁄ectively gains one additional instrument (one degree of freedom),
which should then increase welfare. However, in practice, DRG weights are based on a more
restrictive average-cost rule (yardstick competition), and cannot be set by the purchaser
at an arbitrary level. We show that if prices are set equal to the average cost reported by
the providers (as for example in Shleifer, 1985) then re￿ning DRGs (i.e. introducing an
2additional price) is not necessarily welfare improving.
More precisely, the results of the model suggest that if prices are re￿ned, then the
provider has an incentive to overprovide the more intensive treatment. In contrast, when
prices are not re￿ned, providers may overprovide or underprovide the more intensive treat-
ment. If altruism is low compared to the opportunity cost of public funds, and prices are
not re￿ned, then the provider underprovides the more intensive treatment.
This study contributes to the literature on provider incentives in health care (see Ellis
and McGuire, 1986, 1990; Pope, 1989; Levaggi, 1996; Ellis, 1998; Ma, 1994; Chalkley and
Malcomson, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Rickman and McGuire, 1999; DeFraja, 2000; Barros,
2003; Beitia, 2003; Eggleston, 2005; Jack, 2005; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005; Brekke and
Słrgard, 2007). Our main departing assumption from the existing literature is that we
allow more than one type of treatment for a given diagnosis, and that these treatments
can be reimbursed at di⁄erent prices.
There appears to be only a small theoretical literature which investigates the optimal
payment system when more than one type of treatment is available for the same diagnosis.
Malcomson (2005) investigates the optimal payment system, when there is asymmetric
information on patient type and the cost of treatment. He uses a framework with two
possible treatments for the same diagnosis, where the payment made by the purchaser
can only be conditioned on the type of treatment provided. In the model the provider
of health care decides which treatment to provide and to whom. Thus, dumping of some
patients is allowed. In general it is optimal to pay a di⁄erent price for di⁄erent treatments.
However, the optimal provision of treatments di⁄ers from what would be e¢ cient if the
purchaser had full information.
Boadway, Marchand, and Sato (2004) analyse the incentive for the providers to overuse
expensive treatments. They suggest that the incentives of hospitals and doctors to assign
patients to the high-tech treatment can be controlled in part through the reimbursement
system. Within a hierarchical model involving three decision makers, the government, the
hospital manager, and the doctor, they derive the optimal hospital reimbursement when
3patients, who di⁄er in severity of illness, can be treated by either an expensive high-tech
therapy or a cheaper low-tech therapy.
Siciliani (2006) is concerned with the optimal payment scheme when there are two
treatments available for the same diagnosis, a more intensive treatment and a less intensive
treatment, and the average severity of illness di⁄ers across hospitals. If the average severity
of illness is private information only known to the provider, the provider has an incentive
to overprovide the surgical treatment to patients with low severity of illness. The optimal
payment scheme, when information is asymmetric, involves paying hospitals which provide
a higher share of surgical treatments a higher price for the surgical treatment, and a lower
price for the medical treatment.
The model presented in this study is di⁄erent from the above models in several respects.
First, and most importantly, the price is determined according to the average cost within
each DRG, as we observe in many health care systems (and in line with the seminal
paper of Shleifer 1985). This is in contrast with Boadway, Marchand, and Sato (2004),
Malcomson (2005), and Siciliani (2006) where the purchaser can set prices at any level
and also make use of lump-sum transfers. Second, it di⁄ers from Siciliani (2006) and
Malcomson (2005) in that the provider is semi altruistic and thus cares for the bene￿t of
the patients.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main assumptions
of the model. Section 3 solves the maximisation problem of the provider. Section 4
derives the optimal solution from the purchaser￿ s perspective and the welfare implications
of re￿ning prices. Section 5 discusses some extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Patients with a certain diagnosis can receive one of two possible treatments of di⁄erent
intensity from the provider of health services (a hospital). Denote ￿ as the less intensive
treatment, and ￿ as the more intensive treatment (for example an invasive treatment or
a surgical procedure). Patients are assumed to di⁄er in the severity of illness s 2 [s;s].
4Severity has density function f (s) and cumulative distribution function F (s). The number
of patients treated by each hospital is normalised to one.
The bene￿t from treatment to the patient depends on which treatment the patient
receives and the severity of the patient. The bene￿t from the more intensive treatment
for a patient with severity s is b(￿;s) while from the less intensive treatment is b(￿;s).
Patient￿ s severity is observed by the provider, which decides what type of treatment to
provide. Patients have a passive role and accept to undertake any treatment decided by
the provider.
As a clinical example, consider a patient diagnosed with ischemic heart disease caused
by the narrowing of coronary arteries in the heart, which results in diminished blood ￿ ow
to the heart. The diminished blood ￿ ow can cause a lack of oxygen to the heart muscle,
which can cause severe chest pain called angina. Patients su⁄ering from mild angina
often fare well on medication such as nitrates, beta-blockers or calcium-blockers. However,
sometimes medication is not enough to alleviate or control the symptoms of the disease. In
that case there are more intensive treatments available, like an operation, called coronary
artery bypass graft (CABG), or an invasive nonsurgical treatment where the coronary
arteries are widened from inside the blood vessels by using a tube with an in￿ atable balloon
attached to it (this procedure is known as percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
or PTCA). The more severe the symptoms become, such as a persistent angina, the less
bene￿t for the patient from medication such as nitrates or beta-blockers. The medication
is no longer su¢ cient to alleviate the symptoms.
We assume that: 1) b(￿;s) ￿ b(￿;s): patient￿ s bene￿t is higher when the more intensive
treatment is provided;1 2) bs(￿;s) ￿ bs(￿;s): patients with higher severity bene￿t more
from the more intensive treatment than patients with lower severity (see Figure 1).
The number of hospitals providing treatment to patients is H. Each hospital i =
1;:::;H; maximizes utility denoted with Ui. Hospitals are assumed to be partially altruistic
in the sense that they care at least to some extent about the bene￿t of the treatment they
1In section 5 we discuss the case where patients with low severity might have lower bene￿t from the
more intensive treatment.
5provide to patients. We therefore assume that the hospital maximizes Ui = ￿Bi+Ti￿Ci,
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the degree of altruism, i.e. the weight that the hospital attaches to
patients￿bene￿t from treatment; Bi is the total bene￿t obtained from treating patients at
hospital i (de￿ned more precisely below); Ti is the transfer received by hospital i; and Ci
is the total cost incurred by hospital i from the provision of treatment.
The cost of treating each patient is a function of the type of treatment and patient￿ s
severity of illness. The cost of the less intensive treatment is c(￿;s) and the cost of the




. In order to keep the exposition of the model simple,
the less intensive treatment ￿ will hereafter be referred to as the medical treatment, and
the more intensive treatment ￿ as the surgical treatment. We assume that the cost of
treatment increases with the severity of illness of the patient: cs(￿;s) > 0. Moreover,
we assume: 1) cs(￿;s) ￿ cs(￿;s): the cost increases more quickly with severity for the
medical treatment than with the surgical treatment; 2) c(￿;s) ￿ c(￿;s): the cost of the
surgical treatment is higher than the cost of the medical treatment for patients with lowest
severity; 3) c(￿;s) ￿ c(￿;s): the cost of the medical treatment is higher for patients with
highest severity. Finally, we assume that the bene￿t is always higher than the cost for any
level of severity. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of a bene￿t and a cost function
which satis￿es our assumptions.
Consider again the example of patients with ischemic heart disease. The cost of pro-
viding medical treatment to a patient with angina has a low ￿xed cost. However, if the
disease progresses and the symptoms become more severe the patient is in need of increas-
ing medical treatment such as intravenous medication requiring intensive monitoring with
increased specialised sta⁄ and rapidly increasing costs. When patients with angina are
provided with either one of the more intensive treatment, CABG or PTCA, the ￿xed cost
of providing the treatment is higher than the ￿xed cost of providing the medical treatment
due to ￿xed costs related to the CABG surgery or resources needed for the invasive PTCA
treatment. All patients undergoing CABG or PTCA require certain monitoring and care
following the procedures regardless of the severity of illness. However, more severely ill
6patients may require more intensive care or prolonged monitoring. In the cost structure
applied in this section it is assumed that the monitoring and care following the more inten-
sive treatments is increasing at a slower rate with severity than for the medical treatment.
This assumption may not be realistic for all types of treatments. In section 5 we discuss
the case where the cost of surgical treatment is always higher than the cost of the medical
treatment for any level of severity: c(￿;s) ￿ c(￿;s) for any s (as we will show the results
are not a⁄ected qualitatively by this assumption).
We de￿ne zi as the cut-o⁄ severity point above which the more intensive treatment is
provided. The number of medical treatments is ni =
R zi
s f(s)ds = F(zi), and the number
of surgical treatments is ni =
R s
zi f(s)ds = 1 ￿ F(zi). The total number of treatments
provided at hospital i is one (ni = ni+ ni = 1).
The total cost of treatment at each hospital i, when the cut-o⁄ point is zi, is Ci (zi).
It consists of the sum of the cost of providing the medical treatment, CL
i (zi), and the cost
of providing the surgical treatment, CH
i (zi):
Ci(zi) = CL












Similarly, the total bene￿t from treating ni number of patients with the medical treatment,












We assume that patients￿severity of illness is observed by the provider but not by the
purchaser. The treatment instead is known to both the provider and the purchaser. We
assume that hospitals must treat all patients with severity s 2 [s;s], i.e. hospitals cannot
dump patients.
When the purchaser contracts with hospital i = 1;:::;H, prices are set equal to the
average cost of providing the treatment at the H hospitals. This price setting mechanism
is in line with how the price for each DRG is determined in the health care systems of
7many OECD countries (see Shleifer, 1985 for a similar speci￿cation).
If prices are unre￿ned the purchaser pays the same price p for the medical and the
surgical treatment. The price is equal to the average cost of providing the treatments at







If the purchaser instead decides to re￿ne prices, the purchaser sets two di⁄erent prices.














3 Optimal cut-o⁄ severity point
Hospital i = 1;:::;H, maximizes utility, Ui = ￿Bi+Ti￿Ci, with respect to the optimal cut-
o⁄ point zi. The hospital provides the medical treatment to patients with severity below
the optimal cut-o⁄ point, and the surgical treatment to patients with severity above the
optimal cut-o⁄ point.
3.1 Unre￿ned price
The transfer to hospital i when prices are unre￿ned is the price multiplied by the number
of patients treated






Hospital i maximization problem is
Max
zi
Ui(zi;z￿i) = ￿Bi(zi) + p(zi)ni ￿ Ci(zi) (6)




i ni ￿ 1
￿
Czi = 0. In
the symmetric equilibrium zi = zj = zu, where zu denotes the optimal cut-o⁄ point for
8the hospital under unre￿ned prices. Also ni = nj= 1, so that ni=
PH
i ni = 1=H. The
FOC can be written as
￿Bz (zu) ￿ (
H ￿ 1
H
)Cz (zu) = 0 (7)

















zu is set at the level where the marginal bene￿t of an additional medical treatment ￿
is equal to the marginal cost. When the hospital provides one more medical treatment,
it substitutes a medical treatment for a surgical one. Since by assumption the surgical
treatment is always more bene￿cial, an additional medical treatment reduces total patients







f(zu) < 0). On the other hand, one more
medical treatment reduces costs as the surgical treatment is more expensive than the
medical treatment for low-severity patients (c
￿
￿;zu￿
> c(￿;zu)). At the optimum, the
marginal savings from an additional medical treatment are equal to the hospital￿ s value
of the marginal reduction in patient￿ s bene￿t.




























which is satis￿ed since by assumption cost increases with severity more quickly under




e￿t increases more quickly with patients￿severity under the surgical treatment than under





Note that, for any positive ￿, by choosing the cut-o⁄ point the provider has also an
in￿ uence on the price. However, if the number of hospitals is su¢ ciently large (H ! 1)
then the hospital￿ s own e⁄ect on price becomes negligible as limH!1
H￿1
H = 1.
As a special case, note that if the provider is pro￿t maximiser, i.e. altruism is zero




= c(￿;zu): the cut-o⁄ point zu(￿ = 0) is chosen such that the cost
of the medical and surgical treatment are equated (see point E in Figure 1).
Suppose now that altruism is at the highest level, i.e. ￿ = 1, and the number of
hospitals H is large so that H￿1
H ￿ 1. Then in Figure 1, the optimal cut-o⁄point zu(￿ = 1)
is such that the di⁄erence in the bene￿t from the two treatments (AB) is equal to the
di⁄erence in cost (CD).
From the ￿rst order condition, we also obtain








More altruism implies a lower cut-o⁄point, and a higher (lower) number of surgical (med-
ical) treatments. In Figure 1 we have zu(￿ = 1) < zu(￿ > 0) < zu(￿ = 0):
In summary, with unre￿ned prices the purchaser pays the same price for both treat-
ments and the optimal cut-o⁄ point for the semi-altruistic hospital is greater than zero,
resulting in the hospital providing the medical treatment to patients with severity below
the optimal cut-o⁄ point and the surgical treatment to patients with severity above the
optimal cut-o⁄point. Finally, note that since price is set equal to the average costs, pro￿ts
are zero for healthcare providers.
3.2 Re￿ned prices
If prices are re￿ned the purchaser pays two di⁄erent prices for the two treatments, price
p for the medical treatment and price p for the surgical treatment. The overall transfer




Ui(zi;z￿i) = ￿Bi(zi) + p(zi)ni (zi) + p(zi)ni (zi) ￿ CH
i (zi) ￿ CL
i (zi) (10)





















Since we assume identical hospitals, the optimal cut-o⁄point for each hospital is the same
in equilibrium and equal to zi = z￿i = zr. The above simpli￿es to:
@Ui(zi;z￿i)
@zi













See proof in the Appendix. Note that ￿Bzi < 0 because by assumption the surgical











since the cost of treatment increases with the severity of illness, the average cost of the
surgical treatment over the interval [zr;s] is always higher than the marginal cost of the







F(zr) < c(￿;zr): since the cost of treatment increases with the severity of illness,
the average cost of the medical treatment over the interval [s;zr] is always lower than the
marginal cost at the upper end of the severity interval, zr. Therefore, the marginal utility
from an increase in the cut-o⁄ point is negative and zr = s: only surgical treatments are
provided. The result holds for any positive levels of altruism, as well as when the provider
is pro￿t maximiser (when ￿ = 0).
Intuitively, since the di⁄erence in the two tari⁄s is always bigger than the di⁄erence in
the marginal cost (as p ￿ p > c
￿
￿;zr￿
￿ c(￿;zr)), the provider has never an incentive to
increase the cut-o⁄ point above the minimum severity s. In summary, when DRG prices
are re￿ned, there are strong incentives to overprovide the surgical treatment. As in the
previous case, since prices are set equal to the average costs, pro￿ts are zero.
114 The purchaser
Since hospitals are identical, we can focus on the welfare generated by a representative
hospital, denoted by W. Total welfare is simply H ￿ W.
The purchaser￿ s welfare consists of the total bene￿t of treatment to patients Bi(zi) net
of the social cost of transfer to the hospitals, (1 + ￿)Ti (zi). Since the purchaser raises
revenues by imposing distortionary taxes, it generates a deadweight loss from taxation
captured by the parameter ￿. Welfare is then:
W = Bi(zi) ￿ (1 + ￿)Ti (zi) (13)
The purchaser maximizes welfare subject to the hospital participation constraint Ui > 0.
Furthermore, we also assume that hospitals are subject to a limited-liability constraint, so
that the hospital cannot operate with losses. We therefore assume that the total transfer to
the hospital cannot be less than the cost of providing treatment: Ti (zi)￿Ci (zi) > 0. With
social welfare decreasing in transfer, @Wi=@Ti < 0, the purchaser meets this constraint
with strict equality Ti = Ci. Note that this implies that the utility of hospital is non-
negative, as Ui = ￿Bi ￿ 0 and the hospital participation constraint is therefore satis￿ed.
Substituting into the above we obtain that welfare is: W = Bi(zi) ￿ (1 + ￿)Ci (zi).
An alternative to the above speci￿cation is that the purchaser maximises a utilitarian
welfare function, so that welfare is instead W = Bi ￿ (1 + ￿)Ti + U, the sum of patients
bene￿t and provider￿ s utility net of the transfers to the provider. Given U = ￿Bi+Ti￿Ci,
we obtain: W = Bi￿(1+￿)Ti+￿Bi+(Ti ￿ Ci). From the limited-liability constraint, as
before we obtain Ti = Ci, which implies W = (1+￿)Bi￿(1+￿)Ci. It has been argued (see
Chalkley and Malcomonson, 1999; Hammond, 1980) that this speci￿cation with altruistic
providers leads to double-counting of the bene￿ts of the patients, and that the altruistic
component ￿Bi should be removed from the welfare. If we follow this suggestion we obtain
that the welfare is again: W = Bi(zi) ￿ (1 + ￿)Ci (zi).
12The purchaser maximizes welfare with respect to zi
Max
zi
W = Bi (zi) ￿ (1 + ￿)Ci(zi) (14)
The ￿rst order condition is @W (zi)=@zi = 0 or
Bzi(z￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)Czi(z￿) = 0 (15)
with z￿ denoting the ￿rst-best solution. At the optimum the marginal bene￿t from an
















The optimal cut-o⁄ point is such that the cost savings from reimbursing one less surgical
treatment and one more medical treatment is equal to the bene￿t foregone by one less
patient receiving a surgical treatment.
The second order condition is @2W=@z2
i < 0 or, more extensively,
@2W=@z2
















f(zi) < 0 (17)























the purchasers optimal cut-o⁄point is higher when the deadweight loss from raising public
funds is higher, which implies a lower number of surgical treatments.
How does the optimum for the purchaser (z￿) compare with the solutions obtained
when the tari⁄ is respectively re￿ned or unique?
When prices are re￿ned the answer is clear. The hospital provides only the surgical
treatment. There is therefore an overprovision of surgical treatments as z￿ > zr = s.
13If prices are unre￿ned, whether the cut-o⁄ point is too high or too low depends on
the relative magnitude of the degree of altruism and the opportunity cost of public funds.
Comparing the FOC in equation (7) with (15), it is straightforward to establish that the
optimal cut-o⁄ point from the purchaser￿ s perspective is higher than the one chosen by
the provider, i.e. zu > z￿, when 1
1+￿ > ￿ H
H￿1.
Note that for a number of hospitals H su¢ ciently large, H=(H ￿ 1) ￿ 1, so that
zu > z￿ when 1=(1 + ￿) > ￿: there is underprovision of surgical treatments when altru-
ism is su¢ ciently small. Underprovision of surgical treatments always arises when the
opportunity cost of public funds is zero (￿ = 0). Then for any degree of altruism strictly
less than one, ￿ 2 [0;1), the provider chooses too few surgical treatments as zu > z￿ when
1 > ￿.
In contrast, suppose that the provider is perfectly altruistic (￿ = 1) and the opportu-
nity cost of public funds is strictly positive (￿ > 0), then there is certainly overprovision
of surgical treatments as zu < z￿ when 1=(1 + ￿) < 1.
The following proposition summarises the results.
Proposition 1 When the purchaser re￿nes the prices, there is an overprovision of more
intensive treatments: z￿ > zr = s. When the purchaser does not re￿ne the price, there
is an underprovision of the more intensive treatment when the degree of altruism is su¢ -
ciently small (1=(1 + ￿) > ￿), so that zu > z￿.
In the following section we establish the conditions under which it is optimal for the
purchaser to re￿ne prices.
4.1 Welfare comparison
The purchaser obtains a higher welfare when prices are re￿ned if
W(zr) > W(zu) (18)
14or more extensively if
Z zr
s














































[b(￿;s) ￿ (1 + ￿)c(￿;s)]f(s)ds (19)
Intuitively, this condition suggests that welfare is higher under re￿nement when the dif-
ference between bene￿t and cost for the marginal patients is higher when the surgical






















Re￿nement is optimal when the additional bene￿t for the patients with severity s 2
[zr;zu] receiving a surgical treatment rather than a medical treatment is higher than the
corresponding additional cost.
Suppose that when prices are not re￿ned, there is an overprovision of surgical treat-
ments: z￿ > zu. Furthermore, when prices are re￿ned, we have zr = s: It then follows that
z￿ > zu > zr = s. Consequently, since welfare is concave in z and is highest at z￿, in this
case welfare is higher when prices are unre￿ned and W(z￿) > W(zu) > W(zr = s). Re-
￿ning prices would only increase the number of patients receiving the surgical treatment,
moving the hospital￿ s choice of treatment further away from the purchaser￿ s optimum. In
summary, the purchaser should not re￿ne.
Suppose instead that when prices are not re￿ned, there is under provision of surgical
treatments: z￿ < zu. The purchaser in this case faces a trade-o⁄, as re￿nement leads to
overprovision, while no re￿nement to underprovision. The loss of welfare under re￿nement
15is W(zr = s)￿ W(z￿) < 0, where zr < z￿. The loss of welfare under no re￿nement
is W(zu)￿ W(z￿) < 0, where zu > z￿. The purchaser should re￿ne only if W(zr)￿
W(z￿) < W(zu)￿ W(z￿), i.e. when the welfare loss from deviating from the optimal
cut-o⁄ point are smaller under re￿nement.
5 Extensions
5.1 Surgical treatment is always more expensive
Suppose that the surgical treatment is always more expensive than the medical one for
any level of severity, i.e. c(￿;s) ￿ c(￿;s) for any s. The other assumptions are the same
as above. Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration.
As in the previous section, the optimal cut-o⁄ point under re￿nement is the lowest
possible level of severity: zr = s: The FOC is
@Ui(zi;z￿i)
@zi













which is still negative for any cut-o⁄ point, since the di⁄erence in price is larger than the
di⁄erence in the cost of the two treatments (p ￿ p > c
￿
￿;zr￿
￿ c(￿;zr)), and the surgical
treatment is more bene￿cial (￿Bzi < 0).





















Notice that for su¢ ciently low altruism, we have @Ui(zi;z￿i)=@zi > 0: there is no guarantee
that an interior solution is obtained. When altruism is low, a higher cut-o⁄ point may
always be in the interest of the provider. Since the cost of surgical treatment is higher
than the medical one, it is always in the provider interest to replace a surgical treatment
with a medical one when altruism is su¢ ciently low. Indeed, if altruism is zero then this
is always the case, and the optimal cut-o⁄ point is zu = s.
16Under this latter scenario, re￿nement is bene￿cial when W (zr = s) > W(zu = s).
The purchaser faces a stark trade-o⁄: under re￿nement only the surgical treatment is
provided (overprovision), while under no re￿nement only the medical treatment is provided
(underprovision).
5.2 Medical treatment is more bene￿cial for low severity
Suppose that for some low levels of severity, the medical treatment is more bene￿cial than
the surgical treatment. More precisely, we assume: b(￿;s) ￿ b(￿;s): the bene￿t of the
medical treatment is higher for patients with lowest severity; b(￿;s) ￿ b(￿;s) the bene￿t
of the surgical treatment is higher for patients with highest severity.
The FOC when prices are not re￿ned is unchanged. When prices are re￿ned, a cor-
ner solution might not arise anymore, and the cut-o⁄ point may be set above the min-
imum severity. This might arise when altruism is su¢ ciently high and the di⁄erence
between the bene￿t of medical and surgical treatment is also su¢ ciently high (for lower
levels of severity). Figure 3 illustrates such case. Analytically, since ￿Bzi (zi = s) =
￿
￿











































The cut-o⁄ point is such that the marginal bene￿t for the patients from an additional
medical treatment, rather than a surgical one, is equal to the reduction in revenues. In
summary, if prices are re￿ned overprovision still arises but is not complete (both types of
treatment are provided).
176 Conclusions
We have analysed hospitals incentives when more than one treatment is available for a
given diagnosis, and when the purchaser faces the choice between setting a price which
is identical across the di⁄erent treatments (price is not re￿ned), and setting a di⁄erent
price for each treatment (price is re￿ned). Throughout the study, we have also assumed
that prices are determined according to an average-cost rule, as observed in many OECD
countries.
We ￿nd that if prices are re￿ned, then the provider has always an incentive to overpro-
vide the more intensive treatment. In contrast, when prices are not re￿ned, providers may
overprovide or underprovide the more intensive treatment. If altruism is low compared to
the opportunity cost of public funds, then the provider underprovides the more intensive
treatment when prices are not re￿ned.
If providers overprovide the more intensive treatment when prices are not re￿ned,
then introducing re￿nement is not optimal. Re￿nement generates even stronger incentives
to overprovide the more intensive treatment and therefore reduces welfare. However, if
the providers underprovide the more intensive treatment when prices are not re￿ned,
but overprovide it when prices are re￿ned, then the provider faces a trade-o⁄. Whether
re￿nement is optimal depends on the speci￿c shape of the bene￿t and cost function.
Our main policy implication from this study is that in a second-best setting where
prices are set equal to the average cost within each DRG, re￿niment is not always optimal,
and indeed may be welfare reducing.
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208 Appendix. First order condition under re￿ned prices






























































































































Since we assume identical hospitals, the optimal cut-o⁄point for each hospital is the same
in equilibrium and equal to zi = z￿i = zr. Also ni = nj and ni = nj. Noting that
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Figure 1. Optimal cut-off point
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Figure 2. Surgical treatment is always more expensive
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Figure 3. Medical treatment is more beneficial
for low-severity patients
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